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LAW REVIEW ARTICLES THAT 
BACKFIRE 
Gerald L. Neuman* 
Other articles in this Symposium have chronicled the real-
world triumphs of legal scholarship. I have sadder tales to tell. I 
would like to discuss law review articles that have had an appar-
ent influence on the course of legal development, but not in the 
manner that the author intended. 
Many of the readers of this Symposium may have their favor-
ite examples of this phenomenon.1 Such misfortunes can befall 
anyone; both of the instances I will describe involve a highly 
respected constitutional scholar, Professor Henry Paul 
Monaghan of Columbia Law School. They illustrate two mecha-
nisms by which good scholarship can lead to bad law. In the first 
instance, one of Professor Monaghan's proposed reinterpreta-
tions of a troubling Supreme Court decision inspired an even 
more troubling line of cases. In the second, the Supreme Court 
adopted a theoretical approach that Monaghan had advocated, 
but in an oversimplified form that yielded results far different 
from those he recommended. 
I. FIRST CAUTIONARY TALE: FROM PAUL TO PARRATT 
Of "Liberty" and "Property''2 is Monaghan's midterm evalua-
tion of the Burger Court's sacrifice of traditional constitutional 
understandings in order to cut back on the section 1983 litiga-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B., Harvard 
College, 1973; Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977; J.D., Harvard Law 
School, 1980. 
This article is dedicated to Drucilla Cornell. I also owe thanks for helpful comments 
and suggestions to a number of other colleagues, especially Stephen Burbank, Michael 
Fitts, Frank Goodman, Seth Kreimer, Charles Mooney, Susan Sturm, Clyde Summers, 
and Alan Watson. And I would never get anything done without the help of Mrs. Mar-
garet Ulrich. 
1. The example most commonly suggested by my colleagues is the collected writings 
of Judge Robert Bork. 
2. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977). 
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tion explosion. 3 The portion of this article of interest to us here 
is Part I on "Liberty,"' Monaghan's shocked response to Justice 
Rehnquist's expulsion of reputation from the sphere of constitu-
tionally protected liberty in Paul v. Davis.~ 
Davis was a news photographer allegedly defamed by unjusti-
fied inclusion in a police chief's broadside identifying "active 
shoplifters." He sued under section 1983 instead of bringing a 
state law defamation action. In his opinion for the Court dispos-
ing of this claim, Justice Rehnquist expressed fear that permit-
ting the section 1983 action to proceed would make every tort 
committed by the state a constitutional violation. One of Justice 
Rehnquist's techniques for avoidip.g this result was to hold that 
the defamation did not result in a deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law because the reputational in-
terest standing alone was not a form of liberty or property pro-
tected by the due process clause. Monaghan, like other scholars,6 
was disturbed by two related aspects of Paul v. Davis: the dis-
missal of the deeply grounded common-law interest in security 
of reputation from the purview of the due process clause and 
Justice Rehnquist's relentless distortion of precedents that stood 
in the way of his analysis. 7 
In Of "Liberty" and "Property," Monaghan urged that Paul 
v. Davis be sharply limited, or even overruled, a step he did not 
lightly recommend.8 Justice Rehnquist's analysis was too incon-
sistent with traditional and appropriate constitutional under-
standings. Less brutal methods could keep the floodgates closed. 
3. That is, litigation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Since the Supreme 
Court's awakening of § 1983 from dormancy in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), 
litigation under that section has grown to a significant portion of the federal docket. The 
dimensions of this growth, its causes, and whether it continues to deserve the label "ex-
plosion" are disputed issues. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations 
and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 522-23 (1982); Eisenberg & Schwab, 
The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 642-49, 658-71 
(1987); Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the 
Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REv. 610, 611-12 (1979). 
4. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 411-34. 
5. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
6. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 701-03 (2d ed. 1988); Shapiro, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 325-28 (1976); 
Tushnet, The Constitutional Right to One's Good Name: An Examination of the Schol-
arship of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 64 KY. L.J. 753 passim (1976). 
7. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 423-29. Monaghan's indignation was unmistakable: 
"The Court's re-rationalization of the earlier cases is wholly startling to anyone familiar 
with those precedents. In many ways I find this aspect Paul's most disturbing. Fair 
treatment by the Court of its own precedents is an indispensable condition of judicial 
legitimacy." Id: at 424. 
8. Id. at 432. 
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For starters, the Court might have narrowed the range of section 
1983 litigation by reading section 1983 less broadly than the 
Constitution. 9 But even if the Court insisted on tampering with 
the due process clause rather than with the statute, it did not 
need to deny that "liberty" includes reputation. Monaghan iden-
tified three points at which Davis's claim that the state had de-
prived him of liberty without due process of law could have been 
attacked. 
The first was Justice Rehnquist's chosen target: the forms of 
liberty protected by the due process clause could be restricted. 
Monaghan found this retrenchment inconsistent with a long tra-
dition of viewing fourteenth amendment liberty as "an idea em-
bracing all the interests in personal security (including freedom 
from defamation), which had been protected from private inter-
ference by the common-law courts."10 He further found this ap-
proach "wholly at odds with our ethical, political, and constitu-
tional assumption[s] about the worth of each individual."11 
Second, Monaghan observed that the police chiefs circulation 
of the flyer might not have deprived Davis of reputation. The 
fourteenth amendment protects against abuse of government 
power. But not every government action that invades a liberty or 
property interest neces_sarily rises to the level of a "deprivation." 
Monaghan noted, for example, that "ordinarily, negligent con-
duct by the state would implicate liberty or property interests 
but would not ... constitute a deprivation of these interests."12 
This was the solution Monaghan advocated. It left him unim-
pressed with Justice Rehnquist's expressed fear that recognizing 
reputation as liberty would make every defamation a constitu-
tional violation and would convert the fourteenth amendment 
into "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever sys-
tems may already be administered by the States."13 Indeed, a 
decade later, after initially holding to the contrary, the Court 
per Justice Rehnquist adopted precisely this solution in Daniels 
v. Williams 1' and Davidson v. Cannon. 111 Justice Rehnquist did 
9. Id. at 429-30. This would, however, require overruling a long line of cases begin-
ning with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), holding that civil actions may be brought 
under § 1983 for all fourteenth amendment violations, regardless of the existence of 
state remedies. 
10. Id. at 423. 
11. Id. at 427. 
12. Id. at 428. 
13. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); see Monaghan, supra note 2, at 427-28, 
432-34. 
14. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
15. 474 U.S. 344 (1986). 
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not, however, credit Of "Liberty" and "Property." One can only 
speculate as to how much influence Monaghan's article had in 
this respect. 
Of more immediate importance was a third point of attack 
that Monaghan identified in passing.16 Even if Davis had been 
deprived of liberty, the deprivation might not have been without 
due process of law. Davis's claim rested on the due process ex-
plosion and its "much criticized insistence upon adversary pro-
ceedings, absent exigent circumstances, before governmental ac-
tions adversely affecting individual interests occur."17 The Court 
could have concluded that Davis had been afforded due process 
of law because the police department's ex parte "procedures" 
and the availability of a subsequent tort action for defamation 
provided sufficient protection. Moreover, said Monaghan: 
[P]rior hearings might well be dispensed with in many 
circumstances in which the state's conduct, if not ade-
quately justified, would constitute a common-law tort. 
This would leave the injured plaintiff in precisely the 
same posture as a common-law plaintiff, and this proce-
dural consequence would be quite harmonious with the 
substantive view that the fourteenth amendment encom-
passes the same liberties as those protected by the com-
mon law.18 
This is the passage whose influence I shall trace. In its context 
(an important qualification), it addresses the timing of a due 
process hearing and suggests that a common-law tort action may 
often provide a sufficient, though later, vehicle for assessing the 
justifiability of the state's interference with the plaintiff's prop-
erty or liberty interest. The ambiguous, aesthetic observation 
about the "harmoniousness" of this approach does not imply 
that the common-law remedy is by definition the only constitu-
tionally required "process" for an interest with a common-law 
pedigree. Monaghan also made clear that his proposal extended 
only to procedural, and not to substantive, due process.19 
Monaghan took no notice of a fourth point of attack: that Da-
vis might not have been deprived of liberty by the state. The 
argument would be that although the police chief, a state em-
16. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 431 ("I do not pursue these inquiries here because 
they are wide of my primary concern."). 
17. Id. at 430-31 (emphasis in original). 
18. Id. at 431. 
19. Id. at 432. 
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ployee, had infringed Davis's reputational interest, he had none-
theless done so on his own, in violation of state tort law. The 
state itself arguably stood ready to repudiate its employee's ac-
tion by offering redress in a defamation suit. The initial defama-
tion was "state action" in a sense; but the state action was not 
yet "complete," because the state had not yet acted through its 
officially established procedures. Only if the state denied Davis a 
means of redress would it deprive him of liberty without due 
process of law. Essentially, this argument had been made by a 
Seventh Circuit judge before Paul v. Davis was decided, in a sec-
tion 1983 action brought by a prisoner against prison officials 
who had negligently left his cell door open after a search, 
thereby permitting persons unknown to steal his personal prop-
erty. 2,0 The judge was named John Paul Stevens, and the case 
was titled Bonner v. Coughlin;21 after Judge Stevens's elevation 
to the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit sitting en bane af-
firmed his decision on alternative grounds, including a reliance 
on Paul v. Davis.22 
Although both this fourth, state-action-based approach and 
the third, due-process-based approach treat the tort action as 
satisfying the state's obligation to provide due process, the dif-
ference between them is profound. The due-process-based ap-
proach involves a case-by-case assessment of whether procedural 
due process values are adequately served by postponing the indi-
vidual's opportunity for a hearing until after the initial state ac-
tion that deprives her of liberty or property. This assessment 
could rest on a cost-benefit analysis of the Mathews v. Eldridge 
sort23 or could employ other doctrinal or theoretical perspec-
tives. The state-action-based approach, on the other hand, de-
20. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en bane, 545 F.2d 
565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). 
It seems to us that there is an important difference between a challenge to an 
established state procedure as lacking in due process and a property damage 
claim arising out of the misconduct of state officers. In the former situation the 
facts satisfy the most literal reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition 
against "State" deprivations of property; in the latter situation, however, even 
though there is action "under color or' state law sufficient to bring the amend-
ment into play, the state action is not necessarily complete. 
Id. at 1319. 
21. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en bane, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). 
22. 545 F.2d 565, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). 
23. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (listing three relevant factors: 1) the private interest 
at stake; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest and the value of additional 
procedures; and 3) the government's interest). See generally J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985). 
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nies that the state has finally acted because the remedial avenue 
remains open. Nothing in its logic is limited to the procedural 
due process context. Most importantly, this approach reverses 
well-settled understandings regarding what constitutes "state 
action" under the fourteenth amendment;2" indeed, the reversal 
is so extreme that it is perhaps not surprising that Monaghan 
overlooked this tactic. 
Of "Liberty" and "Property" appeared in the March 1977 is-
sue of the Cornell Law Review. It had an immediate effect. In 
. April 1977, Justice Powell quoted the passage that appears 
above211 in support of his holding in Ingraham v. Wright26 that 
due process did not require a prior hearing before the imposition 
of corporal punishment in the Florida public schools. Justice 
Powell reaffirmed the view that constitutional "liberty" em-
braced the common-law rights of personal security.27 But he also 
noted the historical basis for an exception covering "moderate 
correction"28 and found that Florida law preserved both the 
traditional common-law tort remedy and the exception.29 By in-
tertwined avenues of doctrinal reasoning and cost-benefit analy-
sis, Justice Powell found the tort action adequate to protect the 
schoolchildren's interest in avoiding unjustified intrusions on 
their physical security.30 
At this point in the decision, Justice Powell's reasoning be-
came remarkable in a number of respects. First, his doctrinal 
analysis cited in one breath both Monaghan's approach and the 
Stevens opinion in Bonner v. Coughlin-betraying no awareness 
of any difference between them.31 Second, Justice Powell was 
writing in a mode, not uncommon for him, that tended to equate 
due process with tradition. 32 He invoked Monaghan's article as if 
24. See infra text accompanying note 45. 
25. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
26. 430 U.S. 651, 679 n.47 (1977). 
27. Id. at 672-74; cf. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 413-14 (discussing the transforma-
tion of common-law rights into liberties protected from governmental interference). 
28. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120 (stating that "battery is, in some 
caaes, justifiable or lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent or master, gives 
moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or his apprentice"). 
29. 430 U.S. at 676-77. 
30. Id. at 678-82. 
31. Id. at 679 n.47. The citation to Bonner v. Coughlin did not win Justice Stevens's 
vote; he both joined a dissent written by Justice White and added a brief opinion of his 
own speculating that the majority's analysis, though unacceptable in the context of cor-
poral punishment, could apply to certain deprivations of property and might supply a 
more defensible rationale for Paul v. Davis. Id. at 701-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
32. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 n.2 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398-99 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 226-28 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); 
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Monaghan shared his view that due process incorporated com-
mon-law liberties with their historical encrustations intact. 
Third, Justice Powell seemed untroubled by the fact that Flor-
ida law provided neither a prior hearing nor a subsequent rem-
edy for a child who was punished through a teacher's reasonable, 
good faith error.88 He even equivocated about whether a good 
faith error would "justify" an undeserved paddling as a nonin-
fringing "correction."84 But whether or not Monaghan would 
condone this gloss on his proposal, Ingraham laid the ground-
work for worse things to come. 
Justice Rehnquist returned to these themes in Parratt v. Tay-
lor, 811 another due process case involving a prisoner who had suf-
fered a loss of personal property through the apparent negli-
gence of prison personnel. The prison officials pitched their case 
on lngraham86 and won big. Justice Rehnquist began his analy-
sis of this claim with what was either a passi_ng impulse of liber-
ality or a brilliant Machiavellian move, holding that negligent 
loss of property amounts to a "deprivation" within the meaning 
of both section 1983 and the due process clause. 87 Repeating his 
fear that upholding the claim would convert the fourteenth 
amendment into "a font of tort law,"88 he invoked Bonner v. 
Coughlin and Ingraham as demonstrating that the state's subse-
quent tort remedy satisfied its obligation to supply due process 
of law. Not sharing Justice Powell's romance with the common 
law, Justice Rehnquist wrote in positivist terms, distinguishing 
between deprivations pursuant to "established state procedure" 
and "unauthorized act[s]" of deprivation. "Unauthorized acts," 
though "under 'color of law,'" were "beyond the control of the 
State. "89 In the latter situation, a subsequent damage remedy 
supplied all that due process required. 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell, 
J.). 
33. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677 n.45 (1977); see also id. at 693-95 (White, 
J., dissenting). 
34. Id. at 675-78. 
35. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
36. See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 9-13, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 
(1981) (No. 79-1734); Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on 
Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 555 (1982). The other argument made at 
length, but not accepted by the Court, was that a § 1983 action cannot be predicated on 
negligence. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 14-30. 
37. Parrott, 451 U.S. at 532-35 (§ 1983), 536-37 (due process). Justice Rehnquist 
sternly rejected his own argument, insisting that it would "trivialize" the Constitution, 
five years later in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). 
38. Parrott, 451 U.S. at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). 
39. Id. at 541. 
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Like Ingraham, the Parratt opinion was Janus-faced, looking 
both to the issue of when to hold the state responsible for offi-
cials' actions and to the practicability of requiring a predepriva-
tion hearing. The opinion did not make fully clear whether his 
analysis embraced only procedural, or also substantive, due pro-
cess. Some concurring Justices worried that the majority opinion 
read as if substantive due process did not even exist.'0 
Parratt's revisionist approach to the relationship between due 
process and state postdeprivation remedies for "unauthorized" 
acts has spread like wildfire through the federal courts.41 The 
Supreme Court extended its application to the intentional-and 
allegedly malicious-"unauthorized" destruction of a prisoner's 
property in Hudson v. Palmer.42 Chief Justice Burger continued 
the Ingraham-Parratt tradition of failing to distinguish between 
the "impracticability" of a prior hearing and a holding that "the 
state's action is not complete until and unless it provides or re-
fuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy."43 This lat-
ter analysis runs violently counter to Monaghan's recommenda-
tions. As he acidly wrote in Of "Liberty" and "Property," "the 
more reprehensible and subject to legal redress the conduct, the 
freer the state is to engage in it."" 
If Parratt is read to permit the state to disavow a state of-
ficer's misconduct as "not complete" or not the state's own ac-
tion simply because the misconduct is unlawful and remediable 
under state tort law, the case threatens to revolutionize well-set-
tled aspects of the "state action" doctrine under the fourteenth 
amendment. Acts by state officials; even if unlawful under state 
law, have been understood as incontestably "state action" since 
1913, when the Supreme Court characterized the contrary pro-
position as follows: 
The vice which not only underlies but permeates the 
proposition is not far to seek. It consists first in causing 
by an artificial construction the provisions of the Four-
40. Id. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 547 (Powell, J., concurring). 
41. See Blum, Applying the Parrett/Hudson Doctrine: Defining the Scope of the Lo-
gan Established State Procedure Exception and Determining the Adequacy of State 
Postdeprivation Remedies, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 695 (1986); Nahmod, Due Process, 
State Remedies, and Section 1983, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 217 (1985); Note, Parrett v. Taylor 
Revisited: Defining the Adequate Remedy Requirement, 65 B.U.L. REV. 607 (1985) [here-
inafter B.U. Note); Note, Due Process: Application of the Parrett Doctrine to Random 
and Unauthorized Deprivation of Life and Liberty, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (1984). 
42. 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 
43. Id. at 533 (emphasis added); see id. at 533 n.14 (calling result "foreshadowed" by 
discussion of Ingraham in Parrott). 
44. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 427. 
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teenth Amendment not to reach those to whom they are 
addressed when reasonably construed; and second in 
wholly misconceiving the scope and operation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby removing from the con-
trol of that Amendment the great body of rights which it 
was intended it should safeguard and in taking out of 
reach of its prohibitions the wrongs which it was the pur-
pose of the Amendment to condemn.'11 
705 
Some Justices have insisted that Parratt does not apply to lib-
erty interests (as opposed to property interests) or to substan-
tive due process (as opposed to procedural due process).'6 But 
these issues remain unresolved by the Supreme Court as of this 
writing, and it is hard to see why the distinctions make sense if a 
state action analysis is truly involved.'7 
Parratt's capacity for turning the clock back a century with 
regard to the relationship between the federal government and 
state officials, particularly once extended to intentional conduct, 
provoked Monaghan to take up the cudgels against this line of 
cases again, in a 1986 article entitled State Law Wrongs, State 
Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment.'8 He identified 
a number of possible strategies for limiting or refashioning Par-
ratt, including: (1) restricting it to a procedural due process 
analysis;'9 (2) treating it as a judicially crafted abstention or ex-
haustion doctrine;110 (3) limiting it to the actions of "lower eche-
lon state employees";111 and ( 4) recharacterizing it as a construc-
tion of the conditions for liability under section 1983.112 
45. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286 (1913); see 
Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
86 CoLUM. L. REV. 979 (1986); Note, Unauthorized Conduct of State Officials Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment: Hudson v. Palmer and the Resurrection of Dead Doctrines, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1985). 
46. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 336-43 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (ex-
empting substantive due process but not liberty); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 541 
n.4 (1984) (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part) (exempt-
ing substantive due process); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 545 (1981) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (exempting life and liberty); id. (White, J., concurring). 
47. Monaghan reads Parratt itself as rejecting a substantive due process claim, 
Monaghan, supra note 45, at 985-86, but the opinion is at the very least ambiguous on 
this point and surely open to reexamination in light of the doubts of the concurring 
Justices, see Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 552-53 (Powell, 
J., concurring in the result). 
48. Monaghan, supra note 45. 
49. Id. at 984. 
50. Id. at 987-88. 
51. Id. at 994 & n.98 (quoting Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
52. Id. at 999. 
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Monaghan called for Parratt to be overruled, or at least re-
shaped into a nonconstitutional doctrine. We may wish him 
greater success this time. 
* * * 
Even when limited to a procedural due process doctrine turn-
ing on the "impracticability" of prior hearings, Parratt and 
Hudson threaten serious damage to settled understandings. 
With the reader's indulgence, I will add to Monaghan's critique 
of Parratt a perspective of my own. 53 Because the Supreme 
Court's Parratt cases arose as section 1983 actions, the state tort 
action has been the hypothetical road not taken. Its characteris-
tics and probable outcome have been somewhat speculative. 
But suppose we consider the problem from the alternative 
viewpoint: the plaintiff has been deprived of liberty or property 
without a hearing by means of "random and unauthorized" offi-
cial acts, has pursued a state law remedy, and has lost. Does any 
federal issue remain for direct review in the Supreme Court or 
for habeas corpus relief if the plaintiff remains in confinement? 
The Parratt approach would suggest that the only federal issue 
available is the adequacy of the state law remedy. But in that 
case, what does "adequacy" mean? 
In its eagerness to close the door on the section 1983 plaintiff, 
the Supreme Court has put the burden on the plaintiff to 
demonstrate "inadequacy" and has tended to compare the fea-
tures of state tort law with those of section 1983. 54 This has led 
some courts and commentators to suggest that a state law rem-
edy may be "adequate" for Parratt purposes even if the plain-
tiff's loss is foreordained by defenses of sovereign immunity or 
official immunity that could have been raised in a section 1983 
action. 55 Yet this would permit the plaintiff to be deprived of 
her liberty or property without ever having had an opportunity 
53. I recognize the risk that I will thereby make this article prove its own thesis, since 
pointing out absurd consequences that could flow from a legal doctrine generally has 
three possible effects: (1) no effect at all (the most likely); (2) modification of the doc-
trine (perhaps the least likely); or (3) bringing on the absurd consequences. 
54. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 
543-44 (1981). But see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 341-42 (1986) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (testing the adequacy of a remedy for "fundamental 
unfairness"). 
55. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 41, at 723-25; B.U. Note, supra note 41, at 623-27, 
638; see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (stat-
ing that sovereign immunity does not render procedure "fundamentally unfair"). 
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to test the merits of her claim to it. The opportunity to be heard 
required by due process is the opportunity to be heard on the 
merits of the deprivation. 118 For example, the Court's precedents 
upholding summary action generally do so on the ground that 
exigent circumstances require swift action, and that an opportu-
nity for a hearing on the merits unprejudiced by the prior sum-
mary determination is aff orded.117 
A more appropriate standard of comparison in Parratt cases, 
rather than the section 1983 procedure, is the procedure that 
due process would have required if the deprivation had been au-
thorized under state law. To the extent that the latter question 
is controlled by Mathews v. Eldridge-type cost-benefit balanc-
ing, Ingraham suggests that exigencies may sometimes result in 
due process being satisfied by a sufficiently trustworthy ex parte 
procedure, followed only by a deferential judicial hearing, rather 
than by the usual opportunity for a full airing of the merits.118 
But there is little reason to regard random and unauthorized 
deprivations of liberty or property by state officials as a trust-
worthy ex parte procedure comparable to the authorized exer-
cises of disciplinary judgment by public school teachers. Thus, 
even a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis suggests that the "ade-
quate" state remedy must provide a full inquiry into the merits, 
unhampered by deferential standards of review or defenses of 
good faith or reasonable belief. Sovereign immunity and official 
immunity in particular cannot be defensive shields in the reme-
dial action, as they would not have been available as swords in 
the affirmative proceeding that the state should have brought 
against the individual. 
Confusion about the "adequacy" issue is especially evident in 
the lower court cases that apply the Parratt analysis to "random 
and unauthorized" departures from procedural regularity in the 
course of a predeprivation hearing conducted under state law.119 
56. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434-35 (1982); Memphis Light, 
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 n.19 (1978); Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 
U.S. 190, 199 (1933); 8. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.9 at 221 (2d ed. 1984) 
("[W]here due process requires a hearing, it must be on the merits of the controversy."); 
see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 n.10 (1975). 
57. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1974); Ewing v. Myt-
inger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 
253-54 (1947); see also Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1931). 
58. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677-78, 682 (1977). 
59. Compare Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 830 F.2d 
977 (holding that Parratt bars § 1983 claim based on county supervisor's financial inter-
est in zoning decision), amended, 841 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 79 
(1988); Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that Parratt 
bars § 1983 claim based on firing of police captain by biased superiors); Lee v. Hutson, 
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For example, in Holloway v. Walker, the Fifth Circuit held that 
a plaintiff who had allegedly been deprived of a fair trial by a 
state trial court judge who was allegedly bribed could not bring 
a section 1983 action because the state provided "adequate" ap-
pellate review.60 Treating this due process deprivation as "not 
complete" until the state has failed to provide an "adequate" 
appellate remedy seems quite consistent with the peculiar logic 
of Hudson v. Palmer.61 But note the consequence: so long as the 
state appellate remedy provides an "adequate" opportunity to 
show that the trial was a mockery, the plaintiff has been af-
forded due process regardless of whether the appellate court cor-
rectly rules on the facts or the law concerning the trial's validity. 
The only federal issue available on direct review is then the "ad-
equacy" of the appellate procedure, not whether the trial was 
fair. Applying this to the field of criminal procedure, we would 
say that neither direct review nor habeas corpus will lie for "ran-
dom and unauthorized" trial court improprieties so long as the 
state affords "adequate" corrective process, since the only fed-
eral issue in such cases is the "adequacy" of the state's correc-
tive process. Needless to say, this would revolutionize criminal 
810 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that Parratt bars § 1983 claim that civil service 
board hearing was a sham); Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir.) (holding that 
Parratt bars § 1983 claim based on alleged bribery of state court judge), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 984 (1986) and Collins v. King, 743 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that Par-
ratt bars § 1983 claim based on participation of biased prison official in disciplinary 
hearing) with Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (holding that 
Parratt does not bar § 1983 claim based on prosecutor's conspiratorial abuse of criminal 
process) and Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that Parratt 
does not bar § 1983 claim based on concededly defective prison disciplinary hearing that 
also violated state rules), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986). 
60. Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d, 1287, 1292-93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 
(1986). In fact, the state courts found that the plaintiffs' effort to overturn the state trial 
court judgment in federal court barred them from seeking state appellate review. Id. at 
1290 (citing Humble Exploration Co. v. Browning, 690 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1986)). 
61. 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) ("Arguably, intentional acts are even more difficult to 
anticipate because one bent on intentionally depriving a person of his property might 
well take affirmative steps to avoid signalling his intent."). Some courts have tried to 
distinguish between Parratt-type cases, in which state officials act unlawfully outside 
any established state procedure, and cases in which state officials act unlawfully within 
an established state procedure whose rules they do not follow. See Bretz v. Kelman, 773 
F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986). The Ninth Circuit tried to justify this distinction in 
terms of the language of the Parratt cases and particularly Logan v. Zimmerman Brush 
Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). But the Supreme Court's approach does not seem to support 
this distinction. In Logan, the Court emphasized that "the state system itself" destroyed 
the plaintiff's property, and that Logan was "challenging not the Commission's error, but 
the 'established state procedure' that destroys his entitlement without according him 
proper procedural safeguards." Id. at 436. 
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procedure: it has been settled since 1953 that federal courts have 
the power to review on habeas state appellate rulings on consti-
tutional defects in trial procedure, regardless of the adequacy of 
the state's corrective process, and the fairness of the trial was an 
issue open to direct review long before that time.62 
Thus, when a lawless state official acting within an established 
state procedure required by due process utterly vitiates the indi-
vidual's right to a hearing, no process that fails to lead to a sub-
stitute de novo hearing can be "adequate" to afford the process 
due.63 The failed hearing is as good as no hearing at all, and the 
state must provide as postdeprivation process the hearing on the 
merits that due process requires. 
II. SECOND CAUTIONARY TALE: To CHEVRON, AND BACK AGAIN? 
My second example implicates deeper questions about the re-
lationship of scholarship to law, and it may be on the road to a 
happier ending. It concerns a standard conundrum of adminis-
trative law: the degree of deference that a court should show to 
an administrative agency in interpreting a statute that the 
agency administers. Monaghan set forth his views on this ques-
tion in a 1983 article with the catchy title, Marbury and the Ad-
ministrative State. 64 The Supreme Court quickly took notice of 
his proposal, and then, a year later, elaborated a strikingly simi-
lar position in the leading case of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc.er, 
The problem of judicial deference to administrative interpre-
tations has traditionally been analyzed under such rubrics as 
"scope of review on issues of law."66 One common approach has 
62. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See generally Bator, Finality in Crimi-
nal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 444, 483-
84 (1963). 
63. In the criminal procedure context, the Supreme Court has held that even the 
opportunity for a de novo trial as of right before an unbiased judge does not redeem a 
statutory procedure that begins with a trial before a judge tainted by pecuniary interest. 
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972). This makes sense from a cost-
benefit analysis point of view, given the ease with which the state can eliminate the 
biased first tier. 
64. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
65. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
66. See, e.g., 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.01-.14 (1st ed. 1958) 
(chapter entitled "Scope of Review of Application of Legal Concepts to Facts"); Jaffe, 
Judicial Reuiew: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239 (1955); Section of Admin. Law, 
Am. Bar Ass'n, Scope-of-Reuiew Doctrine: Restatement and Commentary, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 233, 236 (1986) (section entitled "Standards of Review: Issues of Law"). 
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called for courts to decide issues of statutory interpretation in-
dependently, without ceding any authority in the matter to ad-
ministrative agencies.67 More frequently, courts have given sig-
nificant weight to administrative interpretations,68 often going so 
far as to say that any reasonable interpretation by an agency of 
its governing statute must be upheld.69 From the point of view 
of administrative law, the problem is either (descriptively) to ex-
plain when a court is likely to take the former attitude and when 
the latter, or (prescriptively) to identify the circumstances under 
which such deference is appropriate. 
The administrative law of the Administrative Procedure Act 
generation never settled on an accepted solution to this problem. 
As Judge Friendly concluded, there were simply "two lines of 
Supreme Court decisions ... which are analytically in con-
flict."70 When the legal scholarship of the 1970's and 1980's in-
creasingly emphasized the play of political forces underlying the 
exercise of administrative "expertise"71 and the contested enter-
prise of legal interpretation,72 one could reasonably expect that 
new perspectives would be brought to bear on this unanswered 
question. 
Monaghan did not set out to provide a full account of the cir-
cumstances dictating particular degrees of deference to adminis-
trative interpretation. Unlike the complex inquiries of some of 
his colleagues more deeply interested in the day-to-day workings 
of administrative law,73 Monaghan's investigation focused on a 
67. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947); Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49 (1932); 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.16, at 
403-04 (2d ed. 1984); 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 66, § 30.06. 
68. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Diver, Statut~ry Inter-
pretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 562-63 (1985). But see 5 
K. DAVIS, supra note 67, § 29.16, at 403 (claiming that the Supreme Court itself decides 
independently more often than it defers). 
69. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 
U.S. 402 (1941); 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 67, § 29.16, at 401-02; 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 66, 
§ 30.05. 
70. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd 
sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); see also 4 K. 
DAVIS, supra note 66, § 30.07. 
71. See, e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1667 (1975); Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 
1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271 (1986). 
72. See, e.g., Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Cornell, 
Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for Trans-
formative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988); Fiss, Objectivity and 
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. 
REV. 373 (1982). 
73. See, e.g., Mayburg v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 105-07 
(1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.); Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 
SUMMER 1988] Articles That Backfire 711 
more fundamental aspect of the problem. He posed the question 
of how judicial deference to administrative interpretation could 
be squared with separation of powers and with the traditional 
insistence on final judicial authority in matters of legal interpre-
tation. Thus, in accord with its title, Marbury and the Adminis-
trative State juxtaposes the Supreme Court's consistent exercise 
of independent authority in constitutional interpretation with 
its frequent exercise of deference to the executive branch in stat-
utory interpretation. 
Monaghan rejected the view that courts defer to administra-
tors when the latter's "expertise" assists the judge in resolving 
her uncertainty about a statute's meaning. 74 When a court states 
that it is deferring to an agency in resolving a legal issue, the 
court does not express uncertainty about how the statute should 
be interpreted. Rather, the court interprets the statute as dele-
gating authority to resolve the issue to the agency. Thus, defer-
ence is consistent with the notion that "[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is,"711 so long as we recognize that "the law" sometimes "is" 
nothing more than a delegation of authority to the executive 
branch. Monaghan did not claim that this was a wholly original 
insight. He generously credited earlier scholars who had seen 
that the effect of deference was to create a delegation. 76 But 
Monaghan went beyond these precursors in conceptualizing all 
deference as an interpretive act recognizing tacit delegation as 
the statute's meaning. 
Monaghan never claimed that this theoretical reconceptualiza-
tion of deference solved the problems of when and how much to 
defer. Rather, he said, "the degree of deference that a court 
should give any agency interpretation of law is properly, within 
broad constitutional limits, entirely a matter of legislative in-
tent."77 Because legislatures rarely provide much instruction in 
such matters, courts may evolve presumptions concerning the 
degree of deference appropriate to a given agency action in a 
given statutory configuration. 78 
Once more, the Supreme Court quickly picked up on 
Monaghan's contribution. Marbury and the Administrative 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); Diver, supra note 68; Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in 
Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1 (1985). 
74. See Monaghan, supra note 64, at 30 nn.176-77. 
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
76. Monaghan, supra note 64, at 26 n.149, 27 & n.158. 
77. Id. at 31 n.184. 
78. Id. at 31 & nn.184-85. 
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State appeared in the January 1983 issue of the Columbia Law 
Review. Justice White quoted its central thesis in his June 1983 
dissent in the legislative veto case, Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Chadha. 79 
Monaghan's thesis reappeared, without citation, as the core of 
Justice Stevens's new approach to statutory interpretation in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.80 The Chevron opinion purported to reconcile the two lines 
of administrative deference cases by setting out a two-stage 
analysis. In '.reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute 
committed to its care, a court should first ask "whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."81 The court 
should conduct this inquiry independently, without any defer-
ence to the agency's views. But if the court is unable to find a 
clearly expressed congressional intent, "if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,"82 then the ques-
tion has been delegated explicitly or implicitly to the agency. 83 
The court must then accept any "reasonable interpretation" the 
agency adopts.84 In Chevron, the Supreme Court applied this 
analysis on its way to enforcing deference to the Environmental 
Protection Agency's redefinition of the term "stationary source" 
as employed in the Clean Air Act.811 
The Chevron two-stage analysis has been widely recognized as 
a significant innovation in administrative law and a substantial 
reallocation of power from the judiciary to the executive 
branch.86 Chevron's equation between deference and delegation 
adopts Monaghan's conceptualization, but its implementation 
involves simplifications that Monaghan never recommended. 
79. 462 U.S. 919, 986 n.19 (White, J., dissenting). "But as Henry Monaghan has ob-
served: 'Judicial deference to agency "interpretation" of law is simply one way of recog-
nizing a delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency.'" Id. 
80. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
81. Id. at 842. 
82. Id. at 843. 
83. Id. at 843-44. 
84. Id. at 844. It is surely a sign of the Court's estrangement from the constitutional 
"nondelegation doctrine" that the Court announced unblinkingly as a general principle 
what amounts to a reverse clear statement approach: the Court will always assume Con-
gress delegated legislative power, unless Congress clearly expresses a contrary intent. See 
id. at 843-44. Justice Stevens had purported to be influenced by an opposite norm, con-
struing a statute in a manner that restricted delegation in Industrial Union Dep't v. 
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
85. 467 U.S. at 866. 
86. See, e.g., Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 
283-84 (1986); Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1093, 1119-21 (1987); Sunstein, supra note 71, at 287-88. 
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First, a very controversial aspect of the Chevron methodology · 
involves the translation of all statutory ambiguity into delega-
tion to the executive branch. The Chevron opinion is a prime 
candidate for deconstruction. The text engages in an extrava-
gant reification of an entity known as the "intent of Congress" 
that must be "unambiguously expressed. "87 At the same time, 
tucked away in a footnote, we find a reaffirmation that a court 
can "ascertain[]" congressional intent using "traditional tools of 
statutory construction."88 Justice Stevens was later to be re-
minded, to his discomfort, how facilely his colleagues could man-
ufacture ambiguity in statutory language. 89 Statutes always re-
quire interpretation; the real question is how much interpretive 
authority has been delegated to the court and how much to the 
agency.90 
Second, Chevron mandates a uniform test of "reasonableness" 
for review of all agency interpretations. This carries even further 
the opinion's insensitivity to matters of degree. 
Monaghan's Marbury had been clear in emphasizing the vary-
ing degrees to which courts shared with agencies the responsibil-
ity for interpreting statutory language. "Frequently the court 
will ( or should) understand the statutory mandate as directing 
it, not the agency, to supply all or most of the relevant meaning. 
In these circumstances, the agency view is a datum, a highly rel-
evant one, but a datum only .... "91 With other statutes, "[t]he 
court's task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority, an 
inquiry that includes defining the range of permissible crite-
ria. "92 The court thus defines the zone of discretion within which 
the agency may operate: "the judicial role is to specify what the 
statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not all 
that it does mean."93 Where Congress does not communicate the 
degree of deference it expects, courts may rely on presumptive 
87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also id. at 861 ("an actual intent of Congress"). 
Ironically, this occurs in a discussion whose very subject is interpretation, and which 
cites no evidence whatsoever of congressional intent regarding norms of interpretation. 
88. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. But see, e.g., Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. 
REV. 395 (1950) (pointing out existence of pairs of equal and opposite canons of 
construction). 
89. See Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 984-88 (1986) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
90. Monaghan, supra note 64, at 27-28. 
91. Id. at 27. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
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"rules tying the degree of deference to be accorded agency ac-
tion to the type of agency action involved. "94 
One explanation for the crudeness of the Chevron analysis lies 
in the political goal underlying the decision: reining in policy-
making under the rubric of statutory interpretation by the D.C. 
Circuit.911 Just as in the Vermont Yankee case,96 which was di-
rected at the D.C. Circuit's policy-making in the guise of polic-
ing agency procedures,97 indignation and rhetorical momentum 
may have led the Justices to overstated positions that they will 
prove unable to live with.98 
Beyond that, however, the Chevron standard may have been a 
"natural," though not necessary, consequence of equating defer-
ence with delegation.99 Reconceptualizing deference as the recog-
nition of delegation changes the way questions are asked and af-
fects the verisimilitude of various answers. For example, it 
facilitates a collapse of the distinction between administrative 
interpretation of a statute and administrative adoption of "legis-
lative" rules pursuant to an express delegation of lawmaking au-
thority. The former is now just an "implicit" instance of the lat-
ter.100 Courts are so accustomed to applying a single, very 
relaxed reasonableness standard (in a word, "arbitrary-and-ca-
pricious"101) to the review of expressly authorized rulemaking 
that Chevron's all-or-nothing approach to the review of "implic-
itly" authorized lawmaking seems to follow naturally.102 If defer-
94. Id. at 31 n.184. 
95. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
841-42, 864-66 (1984). For a different interpretation of the Court's purpose, see Strauss, 
supra note 86, at 1118-35 (arguing that allocation of interpretive authority to an agency 
compensates for the Supreme Court's inability, given caseload pressures, to impose uni-
formity of interpretation on courts of appeals). 
96. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
97. See, e.g., id. at 524-25, 546-48, 555, 558. 
98. See 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 67, § 29.17; Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the 
D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 345, 394-95 (1979); Stew-
art, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1805, 1816-17, 1821 (1978). 
99. I would hesitate to say that the adoption of a particular conceptualization of def-
erence necessarily entails particular consequences concerning the extent and scope of 
deference. See Fish, Consequences, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 433, 445-47 (1985). 
100. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984). 
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-45 (1983) (insisting on homogeneity of review 
standard). 
102. See Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. NRDC, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 986,997 (1987) ("Congress either delegated interpretive 
authority to the agency or it did not."). 
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ence, viewed as delegation, becomes a matter of congressional 
intent, then the obvious place to look for indications of degree of 
deference would be where Congress virtually never puts 
them-in statutory language.103 Of course, the Court could just 
as easily have imputed to Congress all the complex factors 
judges had evolved before Chevron for determining the "weight" 
of administrative opinion.10• But the simplism of Chevron was 
the path of least effort. 
Viewing deference as the recognition of a delegation tends to 
favor certain answers to other questions as well. In Chevron it-
self, the Court emphasized that an agency was free to change its 
interpretation: "the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, 
must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its pol-
icy on a continuing basis."106 When agency interpretations were 
accorded "weight" because the agency's expertise gave it special 
insight into what Congress meant, or because the agency's con-
tribution to the drafting of the statute gave it insider's knowl-
edge, the timing and consistency of the interpretation received 
greater emphasis.108 
Although the delegation rationale for deference deemphasizes 
traditional factors of timing and consistency, it gives new promi-
nence to the traditional factor "thoroughness of reasoning." If 
agency interpretation is delegated lawmaking, then presumably 
courts ought to review the policy-based reasoning of the inter-
preter as thoroughly as they review notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. The court should ask not only whether the agency's 
interpretation is among the reasonable alternatives, but also 
whether the agency acted reasonably in pref erring that interpre-
tation. 107 Chevron was decided only a year after the Supreme 
103. See Diver, supra note 68, at 570. 
The Executive has successfully fought off the Bumpers Amendment, which would for-
bid judicial deference to agency interpretations. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 73, at 2-9. 
Furthermore, the language of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), directing the 
reviewing court to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and stat-
utory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action," 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982), has rarely been taken seriously. 
104. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 73, at 371-73, 379-81 (urging "less univocal, less far-
reaching interpretation of Chevron"). 
105. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
863-64 (1984). 
106. See Breyer, supra note 73, at 368-71. Of course, these factors can be reempha-
sized within Monaghan's framework by imputing them to congressional intent, see 
Monaghan, supra note 64, at 31 nn.184-85, and even within the Chevron analysis by 
building them into the definition of reasonableness, see NLRB v. United Food Workers, 
108 S. Ct. 413, 421 n.20 (1987). 
107. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 858 (discussing agency's "reasons for concluding 
that [its interpretation] was more appropriate"); id. at 863-65; Garland, Deregulation 
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Court's ratification of the "hard look" approach to review of 
rulemaking.108 The Chenery principle109 insists that the agency 
must spell out its own reasoning when its order "is valid only as 
a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is 
authorized to make."110 The Chevron approach vastly increases 
the range of issues, formerly viewed as statutory interpretation, 
that are now matters of agency discretion. Looser practices de-
veloped in the days when agency opinion was a "factor" entitled 
to "weight" would appear suspect after Chevron. 
Similarly, it is hard to see why a court would now "defer" to 
an agency's interpretation of its organic statute as not delegating 
to it the power to regulate certain activity. Deferring would 
mean recognizing that the choice of whether or not to regulate 
that activity had been delegated to the agency. Permitting the 
agency to contradict the court on that point seems inconsistent 
with the delegation analysis. Rather, the agency would now have 
to justify the refusal to regulate as a policy-determined exercise 
of its delegated authority. The agency may base this refusal on 
its understanding of technical and administrative realities and 
on its regulatory philosophy, but not on its superior knowledge 
of legislative history or legal precedent. m 
The reconceptualization of deference tends to reopen other 
problems. The Chevron framework leaves little room for accom-
modating "interpretive" regulations that lack binding force of 
law.112 Furthermore, the delegation analysis does not explain 
how to conceptualize judicial deference to officials like the 
Comptroller General, who cannot receive delegations of lawmak-
and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 505, 549-53 (1985). But see Young v. Community 
Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986) (upholding agency interpretation on basis of 
grammatical analysis and fact that it does not lead to "an absurd result"). 
108. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29 (1983). 
109. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
110. Id. at 88. . 
111. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. ICC, 826 F.2d 1125, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 947-48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948, 474 
U.S. 971 (1985). 
112. See Breyer, supra note 73, at 371-72; Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legis-
lative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DuKE L.J. 346, 
357. The fact that the APA specifically contemplates "interpretative rules" and exempts 
them from notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1982), 
makes this more than a nominal inconvenience. See Saunders, supra, at 367. Monaghan 
had recognized that, under his theory, the difference between substantive and interpre-
tive rules was one of degree, not of kind, and that notice-and-comment procedures 
should apply. Monaghan, supra note 64, at 26 & nn.151-52. 
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ing authority. 113 Resolving these questions may force the Court 
to reintroduce considerations of degree· that Chevron had pur-
ported to banish. This may in turn destabilize the uniform "rea-
sonableness" analysis. 
Chevron also tells us nothing about how to review an agency's 
interpretation of its own regulations. Construing a regulation as 
the agency's delegation to itself of authority to adopt reasonable 
resolutions of its own ambiguities would not only be ludicrous, 
but would distract us from the practical reasons for second-
guessing agency interpretations of regulations-unfair surprise 
and circumvention of procedures for amending rules.114 The 
Court in Chevron encouraged agencies to revise their statutory 
interpretations in order to provide flexible responses to changing 
situations without the need to return to Congress for new legis-
lation.1H The Court has not yet indicated a willingness to evis-
cerate the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the 
Administrative Procedure Act in order to maximize agency 
flexibility. 118 
113. Compare, e.g., Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 837-39 (1983) and B.K. 
Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 729-30 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J.) (in-
volving deference) with Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986); Ameron, Inc. v. 
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979, 994-95 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J.), 
cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988) and Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 
197, 201-03 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (involving nondelegation). 
Moreover, understanding federal judicial deference in delegation terms should caution 
against a facile transfer of federal deference practices to federal court handling of state 
agency interpretations in diversity and civil rights cases. But see Huggins v. Isenbarger, 
798 F.2d 203, 207-10 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). The federal Constitu-
tion may not require states to employ separation of powers principles as strict as the 
federal ones, but it does not inhibit them from employing stricter ones either. Tradition-
ally, state law has been less cavalier about delegation and less deferential to agency in-
terpretations of statutes than federal law. See, e.g., A BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE 
RULE MAKING § 9.2.12(0 (1986); 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 707-10 (1965); 
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 73-85, 570-71 & n.86 (1965); Bro-
die & Linde, State Court Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of 
Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 546. 
114. See, e.g., 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 66, § 30.12, at 261-62; Newman, How Courts 
Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 533-34, 536 (1947). 
115. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
863-64 (1984). 
116. In genuine emergencies, agencies are freed from APA notice-and-comment pro-
cedures by the APA itself, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982). Creative reinterpretation of ex-
isting rules might also be a device for circumventing executive review by the Office of 
Management and Budget, see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-34 (1982), but it is not clear that courts should play any role in 
buttressing that office's subterranean procedures. See, e.g., Exec. Order, supra, at § 9 
(attempting to exclude judicial review); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 456-62 (1987). 
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Several thoughtful commentators have found Chevron, in its 
standard reading, too blunt an instrument for the delicate oper-
ation of judicial review.117 More recently, the Supreme Court has 
shown signs of repentance. Justice Stevens seized an opportu-
nity to reinterpret his Chevron opinion in Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca. 118 He brought up 
into text his former footnote stressing "traditional tools of statu-
tory construction" and used it to support rejection of the Execu-
tive's views on "a pure question of statutory construction."119 
Justice Scalia refused to join this opinion, emphasizing Chev-
ron's importance in the courts of appeals and insisting that Jus-
tice Stevens now misunderstands his own opinion.120 The out-
come of this struggle is unclear-even more r~cently, Justice 
Scalia and three other Justices joined in a concurring opinion 
condemning lower court decisions that had viewed Cardoza-
. Fonseca as creating a category of "pure questions of statutory 
construction" where Chevron does not automatically translate 
ambiguity into delegation and deference.121 But Monaghan's 
reconceptualization nonetheless seems secure. Even without fur-
ther intervention on his part, the Court may also be moving 
closer to his perspective on matters of implementation. 
IN PLACE OF A MORAL 
Why do law review articles backfire? I think that there are 
many possible reasons. The examples I have discussed here illus-
trate two of them. 
117. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 116, at 465-69. See also Breyer, supra note 73, at 
372-73; Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis 
of Chevron's Step Two, 2 AnMIN. L.J. 255 (1988); Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Re-
stated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 AnMIN. L. REV. 239, 247 n.4, 268-69 
(1986). 
118. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
119. Id. at 446; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988) (holding that the Chevron approach 
to statutory interpretation is trumped by the rule that statutes should be construed, if 
possible, to avoid constitutional questions). 
120. 480 U.S. at 453-55 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
121. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413, 426 
(1987) (Scalia, White, and O'Connor, JJ., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing as mis-
taken Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Adams 
House Health Care v. Heckler, 817 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted and judgment 
vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988); UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
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Of "Liberty" and "Property"122 backfired because the Court 
seized upon an idea Monaghan had sketched briefly and in pass-
ing. Due process methodology was in flux at the time. Monaghan 
wrote too allusively for his suggestion to be unambiguously iden-
tified with a particular approach to ascertaining how much pro-
cess is due. His suggestion therefore lent itself too easily to a 
historicist interpretation or to a forum-allocation interpretation. 
Monaghan's discussion had some of the traditional failings of 
obiter dicta: one could not foresee all the contexts in which the 
general statement might be applied. (Of course, refraining from 
obiter dicta is not even a purported norm of scholarly writing.) 
The most extreme interpretation, in terms of state action, is 
probably one that Monaghan would not have imagined except as 
a student's blunder.123 Thus, part of the responsibility lies with 
Monaghan's article. It set out too concisely a tempting solution 
to a current problem. But part of the responsibility lies also with 
the unpredictable ingenuity of Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Marbury and the Administrative State12• misfired less under-
standably and therefore more illuminatingly. In this article, 
Monaghan had suggested a more complex model of deference as 
delegation than the Court subsequently adopted. The Court 
simply lifted his central reconciling conception-Justice White 
in Chadha even quoted a key sentence that Monaghan had itali-
cized-without taking along the complexities that rooted it in 
existing judicial practice. Trimmed to an abstraction, 
Monaghan's solution became "revolutionary"1211 and produced a 
"watershed"126 that he had not intended to cross. 
An unfortunate process of oversimplification, a kind of 
Gresham's Law of legal theories, operated to produce Chevron. I 
cannot say for sure where it operated, whether the subtleties 
were filtered out along the path of communication from the 
scholar to the Justices,127 or whether the Justices stylized their 
message to ensure its clear reception by the judges of the lower 
courts. If contemporary caseload pressures leave even the Su-
preme Court impatient with textured analysis, then sophisti-
122. Monaghan, supra note 2. 
123. Monaghan's seeming unawareness of Bonner v. Coughlin may have resulted 
from any combination of three factors: the peripheral character of his interest, the ever-
increasing volume of lower court precedent, and the tendency of many elite scholars to 
concentrate their attention on the Supreme Court. 
124. Monaghan, supra note 64. 
125. Starr, supra note 86, at 284. 
126. Id. at 283. 
127. Nor can I say what role law clerks may have played in the filtering process. See, 
e.g., Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REv. 248, 252 (1981). 
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cated scholarly inquiries are likely to evoke misunderstandings 
like Chevron. Such events augur particularly ill for a contribu-
tory judicial role in administrative law, a subject that has long 
suffered from conflicting pulls toward imposition of greater uni-
formity than the diversity of administrative processes will bear 
and toward an unmanageable fragmentation into numerous in-
dependent subbranches.us Unless courts are going to abandon 
the field altogether, they need to grapple with complexity, not 
shy away from it. 
If the problem lies in the Supreme Court's lack of confidence 
that lower federal judges will follow less elementary directives, 
then the lesson for scholarship may be less dire. Would-be law 
reformers may have to devote more attention to the syntax of 
the Supreme Court's dialogue with the lower courts.129 Perhaps 
with greater fluency in this language, scholars could behave 
more like those poets and novelists who oppose distortion by 
taking a hand in their own translation. 
In either case, continued study of how articles backfire may 
tell us much about both the capacities of scholarship and the 
processes of more potent legal actors. After all, we usually see 
things by virtue of the light that bounces off them. 
128. See Elliott, The Dis-Integration of Administrative Law: A Comment on Sha-
piro, 92 YALE L.J. 1523 (1983); Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative 
Law, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 771 (1975); see also Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A 
Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 120 (1977). 
129. See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the 
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1975); Nagel, The Formulaic 
Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165, 178 (1985). 
